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Abstract: The paper investigates application of functional modeling for independent protection 
layer analysis of risk assessment in complex industrial plant with special reference to nuclear power 
production.  
            Layer of Protection Analysis （LOPA）is a simplified semi-quantitative risk assessment 
method that typically builds on the information developed during a qualitative hazard evaluation 
such as HAZOP. LOPA typically uses order of magnitude categories for initiating event frequency, 
consequence severity, and the likelihood of failure of independent protection layers (IPLs) to 
approximate the risk of a scenario. Identifying the IPLs systematically is a fundamental challenge as 
a basis for estimating the probability of failure on demand of each IPLs and for evaluating the risk to 
a decision concerning the scenario. Functional safety is the main focus of this study, which shows 
the modeling and reasoning capability of functional modeling, e.g. Multilevel Flow Modeling 
(MFM) and its application in IPLs analysis of a design based accident scenario, e.g. Loss of coolant 
accident (LOCA).  Previously, MFM has showed its potential to be used for safety barrier analysis 
and Defense in Depth. 
            The main contribution of the study is to explore a procedure using MFM to identify 
safeguards and then credit some of them as IPLs. Firstly, MFM modeling of the process system 
including control flow structures is presented. Secondly, the rule-based cause reasoning of MFM is 
used to identify initiating causes (chain of causes) of a specific consequence. Thirdly, safeguards are 
derived (safety functions in the system are designed represented by MFM functions) to prevent the 
consequence to happen. Fourth, judging the initiating causes and safeguards whether they can have 
common mode failure. If there is no common mode failure, then the safeguard is considered as an 
IPL. This procedure is demonstrated in a PWR LOCA accident scenario. 
Keyword: Risk Assessment, Functional Modeling, Rule-based Reasoning 
 
1 Introduction 
Safety functions play an important role in 
preventing or mitigating accident consequences. 
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) [1] provides 
a procedure for identifying safety functions and 
evaluating their effectiveness. Specifically, it is a 
semi—quantitative method that can be used to 
identify safeguards that meet the independent 
protection layer (IPL) criteria. Intrinsically, IPL 
are provided by safety systems.  
  
Although the LOPA method has been developed 
for more than 20 years since 1993, it lacks a 
modeling tool of safety systems to analyze the 
interaction between safety and process systems, 
to visualize the propagation of the consequence 
of executing safety systems actions through the 
process system, and finally to credit those safety 
systems functioning as IPLs. Therefore, 
systematic identification of IPLs is a fundamental 
challenge as a basis for estimating the probability 
of failure on demand of each IPL and for 
evaluating the risk concerning the scenario. The 
present study shows the modeling and reasoning 
capability of Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) 
[2] applied in IPLs analysis for a design based 
accident scenario, e.g. Loss of coolant accident 
(LOCA) [3]. Previously, MFM has showed its 
potential to be used for safety barrier analysis 
and Defense in Depth [4].      
 
2 Safety Functions and LOPA 
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2.1 Safety functions 
Safety functions are exploited by safety systems 
to prevent or mitigate hazards harmful for a 
target. Among industries, sectors, and countries, 
different terms are used such as barrier functions 
[5], depth of defense [6], and protection layers 
[7]. Barrier theory in safety engineering research 
can be traced back to 1970s. The concept of 
barrier comes from the analysis of hazards 
concerning with environment, ecology and the 
public health. Haddon [8] proposed ten strategies 
for reducing the human and economic losses. The 
vital sixth strategy mentioned by Haddon is the 
use of material barrier to prevent energy reaching 
the targets rather than separation in space or time. 
Furthermore, the ten strategies represent a 
preference ordering of the barriers. Later in 1980, 
the Management Oversight and Risk Tree 
(MORT) [9] approach focus on organizational 
barriers. In 1989, barrier diagrams have been 
developed by Taylor et al. [10] in Denmark as a 
tool for risk analysis in the process industry and 
it was applied for installations [11-12]. Hollnagel 
has proposed a taxonomy of barriers including 
material and symbolic barriers [13]. However, 
there is no general consensus regarding on the 
concept of barrier in spite of its importance for 
safety engineering. Also, there is a lack of a 
modeling tool for supporting barrier 
identification.  
 
The term of protection layer was proposed in 
chemical industry in the late 1980s, the published 
Responsible Care ®Process Safety Code of 
Management Practices included “sufficient layers 
of protection” as one of the recommended 
components of an effective process safety 
management system. In the late 1990s, to comply 
with the emerging international standards 
emerged for computer based control systems in 
the process industry, LOPA was introduced to 
define the necessary safety integrity levels (SILs) 
for automated safety functions in production 
facilities in the chemical industry. It was 
promoted by Center for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS) in 1993.  The LOPA method is an 
“onion” that has several skins from the core. 
These layers of protection are provided by safety 
measures built into: 
 Process design 
 Basic process control systems (PCS) 
 Critical alarms and human intervention 
(PSD, ESD) 
 Safety instrumented function(SIF) 
 Physical protection relief devices (PSV, 
HIPPS) 
 Post-release physical protection (F&G, 
Fire hydrant system) 
 Plant emergency response (PA) 
 Community emergency response 
 
Process design ensures inherently safer systems 
[14]. Basic process control systems, critical 
alarms and human intervention, safety 
instrumented function and physical protection 
relief devices ensure functional safety. 
Post-release physical protection, plant emergency 
response and community emergency response 
belongs to emergency response. Functional safety 
is the main focus of the present study.  
 
Safety functions in nuclear industry mainly have 
three purposes: 1) controlling the reactors, 2) 
cooling the fuel and 3) containing radiation. 
Safety functions embedded representation in the 
process flow can provide insight for safety 
critical systems which indicate explicit causal 
relations between safety functions and failure 
scenarios. And analyzing such causal relations is 
of great importance in failure analysis, which 
may give an advantage to improve integrated 
safety level of systems. Plant operators can also 
get training from visual representation of safety 
functions in by understanding how to prevent 
accidents by making sure that layers remain in 
function. This is also recognized to be important 
and is emphasized in the Three-Mile Island 
(TMI-2) accident report [15]. Here it is stated 
that dealing with combinations of minor 
equipment failures require operators and 
supervisors who have a thorough understanding 
of the functioning of the plant and who can 
respond to.     
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2.2 Independent protection layer in LOPA 
An IPL is a device, system or action that is 
capable of preventing a scenario from proceeding 
to its undesired consequence independent of the 
initiating event or the action of any other layer of 
protection associated with the scenario. A 
qualified IPL has to be with effective, 
independent, auditable characteristics.  It is a 
key step in LOPA as shown in Figure 1. However, 
in order to achieve it, three steps should be 
accomplished: 1) select a scenario, 2) identify 
possible initiating causes and 3) safeguards.  
Fig.1 A procedure of LOPA method (adopted 
from [16]) 
Researchers have used several approaches for 
achieving the three steps. Most of them used 
qualitative process hazard analysis such as 
HAZOP for defining the scenarios and to 
minimize the overlooking of the potential 
scenarios, which are sequences of events that 
lead to undesired consequences [17]. Then the 
safeguards or protection layers are found by 
using techniques such as the bow-tie method 
[18-19]. For evaluations of the protection layer 
with respect to independence and efficiency with 
regard to risk reduction, approaches or rules are 
put forward by CCPS [20], Stack [21], and 
Dowell [22].  
    
3 Functional modeling 
3.1 Modeling technique 
MFM [2] is a network structured hypergraph, where 
the connection between function nodes (flow 
functions and control functions) is constrained by 
syntax rules. Connections represent casual relation 
(influencer and participate) as shown in Fig.2.and 
Fig.3.  The set of function primitives are defined 
on the basis of a theory of action types applied for 
process systems. States of the function nodes are 
defined by possible failure modes of the specific 
function. MFM provides facilities for semantic 
distinctions between different functional 
abstractions of a system and gives guidelines of 
how to decompose and aggregate system functions, 
and how to relate them to objectives using 
means-end relations [23]. Terminologies of MFM 
can be found in tutorial [24]. The MFM models 
presented in the following are built using a model 
builder called EGolf developed by ELDOR 
Technology, Norway.  
 
Fig. 2 MFM symbols 
 
Fig.3 MFM Modeling of a heat exchanger 
  
Jing WU, Morten LIND, Xinxin ZHANG and Pardhasaradhi KARNATI 
4 ISOFIC 2017, Gyeongju, Korea, November 26-30, 2017  
An objective in MFM represents a situation or state 
which should be produced, maintained, destroyed 
or suppressed. Targets are situations or states which 
are being promoted by the decisions of the process 
designer or the actions of a control agent. Threats 
are situations or states which imply a risk or are 
undesirable by being in conflict with the values of 
the designer or operators.  Targets and threats are 
related to functions in mass or energy flow 
structures by means-end relations which are 
attached with mass or energy flow structures and 
labeled by the name of the related flow function. 
Due to syntax restrictions, targets can be attached 
with produce and maintain means-end relations 
(production objective), while threats can be 
attached with destroy and suppress means-end 
relations (protection objective) as shown in Fig. 4. 
The protection objective could be to suppress a 
potential new state or to destroy an actual state.  
For example, in Fig.4, if the state of storage 
function sto4 is high i.e. high temperature in the 
reactor core then the state of threat thr3 is true. 
Consequently, it disables the barrier function bar2 
deployed by fuel cladding in mass flow structure 
mfs4, which means the fuel enters the reactor 
coolant.  
 
 Fig. 4 Targets and threats combined with 
means-end relations and conditional relations. 
Combinations are constrained by the MFM syntax 
 
Safety functions are categorized into prevention, 
control, protection and mitigation. The barrier 
function in MFM represents the prevention such as 
bar 1 and bar 2 shown in Fig. 3. Bar 1 represents 
the function of the shell to prevent the transfer of 
hot current to surroundings. Bar 2 represents the 
function of tube and shell to prevent the mass 
transfer of cooling water and hot current into each 
other. The functions associated with targets and 
actuated/enabled functions in MFM are control. 
The control functions associated with threats and 
actuated/disabled functions in MFM are protections. 
The mitigation are the safety functions after the 
accidental events happen such as emergency 
response. They are not included in MFM. Those 
can be handled by QRA for calculating safety zone 
after accident, i.e. loss of containment to make an 
emergency plan [25].  
3.2 MFM reasoning 
Reasoning with MFM models is based on the cause 
effect relations associated with the function–
function and function–objective relations [26]. 
These casual-effect relations are general, i.e. 
independent from the concrete systems to be 
modelled. MFM model reasoning is based on a 
fixed set of cause-effect inference rules defined by 
MFM model patterns. The MFM reasoning engine 
developed at Technical University of Denmark 
implements the inference rules in a rule-based 
reasoning shell. The reasoning system propagates 
state information of each function and can derive 
possible cause and consequence paths of a given 
deviation in a functional state. Observations or 
other evidence is used by the reasoning system to 
select cause-consequence paths consistent with the 
given evidence.  
 
The state of barrier function in MFM is either 
normal, breach-us or, breach-ds. Breach-us means a 
leak of the barrier from its downstream to its 
upstream direction and breach-ds means a breach of 
the barrier from its upstream to its downstream 
direction.  Cause and consequence reasoning 
patterns for barriers are shown in Fig.5 and Fig.6. 
For example, if transport function upstream 
connected with balance function has a low or 
low-low state then there is a leak of the barrier from 
its downstream direction. It is equivalent to a leak 
of balance function.    
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Fig.5 Cause reasoning for a barrier  
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Fig.6 Consequence reasoning for a barrier 
  
Deviations may also be caused by transmitter 
failure or the control system malfunction. Some 
accidents report point out that such cause can lead 
to a disaster. Therefore, cause-effect reasoning 
about control actions and relations should also be 
included in MFM to explain why a certain control 
function is triggered and to explain the control 
actions which are deployed. Explicit rules for 
reasoning about control in MFM are descried by 
Zhang and Lind [27]. The reasoning about barriers 
and control functions are also implemented and 
applied in the LOCA accident scenario described 
below.   
 
4 A new approach for barrier 
identification 
The first step in the approach is to get and analyze 
process documentations so that the process 
knowledge acquisition is achieved. Process 
knowledge is held within the organization in a 
variety of forms, including systems and procedures, 
standards and codes, design manuals and other 
forms of process documents.  
 
The second step is to interpret knowledge by 
objective-function-structure decomposition (OFS), 
in a means-ends manner based on existing system 
documents and experts’ knowledge on the 
operational abstraction level. Learnt from previous 
modeling experience of the authors, it takes a major 
effort to create such an MFM model since it 
requires both configuration and operation 
knowledge. Therefore, the OFS-decomposition is 
used as a preliminary step to facilitate the MFM 
modeling. 
 
Thirdly, the MFM is built including safety 
functions. 
 
The fourth step is model verification and validation. 
It is validated that the desired safety targets are met 
and the undesired threats are destroyed. A 
validation procedure can be found in Wu [28]. 
 
The fifth step is to select a scenario from a HAZOP 
study.  
 
The sixth step is to search for safeguards and 
identify initiating causes. Advanced by MFM 
reasoning rules, safeguards and initiating causes 
can be found. 
 
Seventh step is IPLs determination. According to 
the judgment rule sets [20] it is assessed whether 
the safeguards are qualified to be IPLs.  
Objective-function-sturcture 
decomposition
Process knowledge 
acquisition
MFM modeling include 
safety functions
Model verfication and 
validation
Select a scenario
Idenfity initiating causesSearch for safegurds
Do they have 
common mode 
failure?
Y
N
IPL
Non-IPL
Judgement 
rule sets
HAZOP
Fig. 7 A procedure for identifying IPLs 
 
5 An application for a LOCA  
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A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA） is a mode of 
failure for a nuclear reactor. If the engineered safety 
functions (ESFs) are not actuated effectively, the 
results of a LOCA could in the worst situation 
result in reactor core damage. It is a design basis 
accident (DBA) for the PWR. A LOCA can be 
categorized into small-break, medium-break and 
large-break. In essence, the LOCAs are categorized 
according to the number of trains of emergency 
core cooling needed to accomplish the safety 
function, the approximate timing of critical 
evolutions in an accident scenario, the ability of 
control room operators to initiate manual back-up 
actions in case of failed auto-initiation of a safety 
function, etc. 
  
A small LOCA is an event where the high pressure 
safety injection system (or equivalent system) is 
required to maintain coolant inventory, but the heat 
removal through a cracked or ruptured pipe would 
not be sufficient to remove decay heat. At the 
TMI-2 accident, it was such a small break 
equivalent LOCA which was originally caused by a 
malfunction of a feed pump in secondary loop.  
 
The TM2 plant diagram is shown in Fig. 8, the 
plant description can be found in Reference [29]. 
The reactor coolant system (RCS) with safety 
functions will be modeled for the LOCA accident. 
We will investigate whether IPLs exist for 
preventing such accident if only the process design 
and basic control systems are considered.   
 
5.1 Modeling of RCS 
5.1.1 Decomposition of objectives 
From a safety perspective, the overall objective of the 
RCS is to transfer heat from the fuel to the steam 
generator. The objective can be further decomposed 
into mainly three elements: 1.Produce heat by fission 
process; 2. Remove heat from the reactor core 
produced by fission process; 3. Prevent radioactive 
material exposure. The end-means decomposition of 
RCS safety objectives are shown in Fig. 9.  
 
The AND/OR branches in Fig.9 can be seen as an 
end/means decomposition structure for the overall 
objectives and should be read from the end (round dot) 
towards the means (square dots). The process design 
and basic process control systems are represented by 
black boxes. The threats against the safety objectives 
are represented by the yellow boxes. The safety 
functions (ESD, SIF, PSV and HIPPS) in abnormal 
situations are represented by orange boxes. The 
post-release physical protections are represented by 
red boxes. The objectives are decomposed from the 
protection layers strategies by means-ends relations, 
which is different from the safety objectives 
developed from accident management information 
needs point of view [30].  
 
The safety systems include Core Flood System (CF), 
High Pressure Injection, Makeup, and Purification 
System (HPI), Low Pressure Injection System (LPI), 
Reactor Coolant Pressure Control system (RCPCS), 
Reactor Building Cooling System (RBCS), Reactor 
Building Sump System (RBSS). The purification 
system has less to do with the LOCA scenario 
considered and is therefore not included in the 
modeling.  
 
 
5.1.2 MFM models 
The MFM model of primary loop of the PWR in TMI 
under normal operation is shown in Fig. 10. The mass 
flow structure mfs1 represents the primary coolant 
mass flow.  The storage function sto7_RC represents 
the storage of water which is heated up in the reactor 
vessel. The function tra5 represents the transportation 
of water from the reactor to the steam generator by 
hot leg which is represented by the storage function 
sto5_HotWater. The water is transported through the 
steam generator to the cold leg represented by the 
storage function sto3_ColdLeg and further transported 
(tra4) back to the reactor.  The transport function 
tra32 represents the reactor coolant pump. The barrier 
function bar1 is to prevent the hot water in the RCS 
leaks to the steam generator secondary side.  
 
In order to keep sufficient coolant in the circuit and 
maintain its overall system temperature and pressure, 
facilities are installed include the core flood tank, 
pressurizer which is equipped with PORV connecting 
with tail line to the drain tank ,heating rod and the 
volume-compensation nozzle 
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   Fig. 8 TMI 2 plant stream diagram                      Fig.9 Decomposition of RCS objective
 
The storage function sto4 represents the storage of 
water in the core flood tank to keep mass balance 
(bal1) between its water storage in reactor. The 
storage function sto9_PZ represents the storage of 
water inside the pressurizer, and above the water is 
a bubble, or cushion of steam represented by the 
storage function sto10_Steam.  The storage 
function sto6 is realized by drain tank. The water 
volume in the pressurizer can be compensated 
represented by a storage function sto8. It is 
connected directly to influence the level in the RCS. 
Additionally, another water source can be 
considered, which is the function of borated water 
storage tank (sto2).  
 
The pressurizer and its associated control systems 
have the function of controlling the pressure of the 
whole primary system, so the energy flow structure 
efs1 is representing the energy balances in the 
whole primary system. Since MFM represents flow 
of mass and energy, pressure and its effects are 
expressed in the models via energy concepts. It is 
modelled separately in efs 5 by the energies storage 
in the pressurizer vapor phase (sto1) and liquid 
phase (sto13) and represents in this way thermal 
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dynamic aspects. The functions of the pressurizer 
represented in the mass flow structure mfs1 are also 
decomposed into vapor storage and liquid storage. 
The transport function tra9_Spray mediates the 
energy transport tra3 out of the pressurizer and the 
mass storage function sto9_PZ mediates the energy 
storage function sto13 (see [2] for an explanation of 
the mediation relation).  
 
There are five production objectives of the primary 
loop. The energy storage function sto13 maintains 
the liquid phase pressure in the pressurizer (tar1) by 
actuating the heat transport function tra27 to 
maintain control objective 1. The energy storage 
function sto13 maintains the steam pressure in the 
pressurizer (tar2) by actuating the tra3 to maintain 
control objective 2. The mass storage function 
sto9_PZ maintains the water level in the pressurizer 
(tar3). The mass transport function tra5 maintains 
the coolant inventory (tar5). The mass storage 
function sto8 maintains the make-up tank level by 
actuating the tra8 to maintain control objective 3. 
 
 
 
Fig.10 MFM model of RCS under normal operation 
 
5.2 IPL analysis 
As the approach described, the IPL analysis has to 
be evaluated after the safeguards are identified once 
the scenario and the initiating cause were selected. 
 
The initiating cause event of the accident is the 
malfunction of the steam generators emergency 
feed water system (EFW, block valves left shut). 
Instead of looking at the initiating cause, in order to 
see the effect of the initiating cause effect on RCS, 
let’s move one step forward to search for the direct 
effect on RCS caused by the initiating cause, the 
heat transport out of primary coolant is low, which 
means that the reactor coolant pressure increases. 
Then the arising temperature in the primary coolant 
caused the reactor to shut down and the PORV on 
top of the pressurizer was opened as design. 
However, PORV is stuck open, which means that 
the state of transport function tra 17 is high. Let’s 
investigate the consequence. The consequence is 
shown in Fig 11.  
 
It indicates that much of the primary coolant was 
drained away (sto11: high). Meanwhile, the water 
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and steam escape from pressurizer (sto10_steam: 
low& sto9_PZ: low). The pressure of pressurizer is 
low (sto 13: low). The water coolant is loss (tra5: 
low).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 Plausible consequences and counteractions 
of PROV stuck open 
 
Responding to it, it is to increase make up (tra 8: 
increase). Because the pressure of pressurizer is 
low (sto13: low), the counteraction is to actuate 
transport function tra 27 to increase, which means 
that high-pressure injection pumps automatically 
pushed replacement water into the reactor to 
increase the pressure. Those two counteractions are 
the independent protection layer to prevent the 
severe accident leading to the reactor core 
meltdown consequently.  
 
6 Discussion 
In the case study, the existing independent 
protection layers were identified. However, 
recommended barriers to avoid the “PROV struck 
open” and “manual valve close condition” can also 
be analyzed.   
 
PROV struck open (tra 17 is high) can be avoided 
by extra layer of protection, that is, measure the 
differential pressure across the PROV, in case of 
low differential pressure for a period, close the 
block valve. 
 
Manual valve close condition can be avoided by 
implementing another barrier, that is, all the manual 
valves in feed water line to steam generator with 
closed feedback connected to control system with 
an alarm. 
 
The case study presented identified the barriers for 
the LOCA scenario of PROV stuck open. However, 
the MFM model presented in Fig.10 can also be 
used to find out consequence and possible 
counteractions if there is a leak (bar 1 is breach-us) 
from the hot water to the steam generator.  
 
7 Conclusions 
The paper investigates application of functional 
modeling for independent protection layer analysis 
of risk assessment in complex industrial plant with 
special reference to nuclear power production. It is 
concluded that the production objectives and 
protection objectives decomposition of the process 
is very important to facilitate the acquisition of the 
relevant process knowledge from the engineering 
documents. The means-end decomposition of 
objectives is an important step in the development 
of an MFM model. It is also demonstrated that 
MFM can be used to reason about process, control 
and barrier. However, how the threats (ends) and 
safety functions (means) are linked in the MFM 
model requires more work. A case study using 
functional modeling for independent protection 
layer analysis is demonstrated in a PWR LOCA 
accident scenario. 
 
The paper investigates applications of functional 
modeling for independent protection layer analysis 
of risk assessment with special reference to nuclear 
power production. However, the challenges and the 
results presented are common for other industries 
involving risk, such as hydrocarbon production and 
chemical processes. 
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